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Standing in the Way of Cooperation:
Citizen Standing and Compliance with
Environmental Agreements
Neil Gormley*

I. Introduction
As governments increasingly have recognized that durable solutions to
environmental problems require international approaches, efforts at
international cooperation have proliferated. Today, cross-border pollution,
global climate change, and species loss form part of a long list of
environmental ills that put a premium on coordination between states.
Moreover, as the regulatory decisions of one state increasingly affect others
via the price of traded goods and international capital flows, environmental
problems formerly viewed as purely domestic have taken on global
significance.1
Recognition of the transnational character of these problems has
found its way into the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA invoked the history of
multilateral efforts to combat climate change and assessed the significance
of U.S. automobile emissions as a share of total global emissions of carbon
dioxide. The Court concluded that the U.S. automobile industry made a
“meaningful contribution” to global greenhouse gas concentrations and,
ultimately, that this was sufficient for the petitioners - a coalition of states
and environmental groups that sought to force the EPA to regulate carbon
dioxide under the Clean Air Act - to establish standing to sue.2 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for himself and three other dissenters, likewise considered
the global character of climate change, yet the conclusions he drew were
starkly different.3
For these dissenters, the need for international
coordination tended to defeat the plaintiffs’ standing: Because U.S.
emissions cuts might not be matched by other countries - because, in other

*
J.D., 2009, Harvard Law School.
1.
See Neil Gormley, Online Student Note, Safeguarding National Environmental
Regulation in a Liberalized World: Beyond the Trade Promotion Act of 2002, HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.hlpronline.com/Gormley_Student_Note.pdf.
2.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
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words, efforts at coordination may fail - the plaintiffs could not establish
that a judicial remedy would redress their injuries.4 In effect, these justices
insist that climate change and other global environmental problems are
nonjusticiable.5 That is, they are questions for the political branches, not
the judiciary.6
Even though the ineffectiveness of unilateral efforts was a major
component of the Chief Justice’s dissent, little notice has been paid - in
Massachusetts v. EPA, or elsewhere - to the effect that standing doctrine may
have on the ability of the United States to coordinate effectively with other
nations in dealing with climate change and other global environmental
problems. This paper sets out to explore the possibility that domestic
judicial enforcement of global environmental agreements tends to
strengthen efforts at international coordination, and thereby suggests a
deep irony in Chief Justice Roberts’ argument. For the Chief Justice, the
absence of international coordination defeats standing. But a strict doctrine
of standing may itself hinder international coordination.7
The argument proceeds in three parts. I begin by summarizing the
current state of constitutional standing doctrine as it relates to
environmental problems, and identify the risk that strict standing
requirements will decrease the prospects for effective enforcement of
environmental laws. I then explore the link between citizen suits and
compliance with international environmental agreements, and suggest that
doctrinal developments that restrict citizen enforcement - including but
perhaps not limited to new standing obstacles - will hinder compliance.
Finally, I argue that the availability of domestic enforcement will bolster the
credibility of U.S. commitments, ultimately strengthening the U.S.
government’s hand in international negotiations.

II. Standing at a Crossroads
The core requirements of standing, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,8 are derived from the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution, and as such are
now generally assumed to be beyond the power of Congress to modify by

4.
Id. at 544-46 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
5.
Id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6.
Id.
7.
The petitioners themselves pointed out a similar circularity in the
dissenters’ reasoning, suggesting that a favorable outcome in their lawsuit would
increase the likelihood of emissions regulation by China and India. See id. at 544. My
argument about standing, I will attempt to show, implicates questions of
institutional design that are both more durable and relevant to a wider range of
international problems.
8.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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statute.9 The Constitution requires that a plaintiff allege “personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to
be redressed by the requested relief.”10 Thus, Article III standing is
commonly understood to have three mandatory components: injury in fact,
causation, and redressability.
The doctrine of standing is intended to preserve the adversarial nature
of the litigation process “by assuring . . . that the parties before the court
have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome.”11 Lujan,
however, resurrects private law notions of injury that are not only ancillary
to the stated goal of ensuring vigorous prosecution of lawsuits, but also are
largely incompatible with the modern statutory approach to environmental
regulation.12 Fundamentally, this incompatibility derives from the fact that
modern environmental law sets out to regulate the few in order to vindicate
the interest of the many in preservation of a public good - a clean
environment. The Lujan approach to standing tends to prevent the intended
beneficiaries of environmental regulation - citizens generally - from
enforcing these statutorily created rights.13 It does so in at least three ways.
First, Lujan defines the necessary injury in such a way that the values
that environmental litigation generally seeks to protect are difficult to
conceptualize as injuries. Whereas earlier decisions had focused the
standing inquiry on whether the plaintiff had suffered a legal wrong,14
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp15 opened the door for the
reinsertion of a factual conception of injury from the common law. Lujan
tied this factual inquiry more closely to private law notions: a
constitutionally sufficient “injury-in-fact” must be “concrete and
particularized” and must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.”16
The difficulty that meeting this concreteness requirement poses for
environmental plaintiffs is evident from even a cursory examination of the
cases that have reached the Supreme Court. Though the Supreme Court
9.
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992).
10.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
11.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12.
See generally, Robert V. Percival, Greening the Constitution - Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL L. 809 (2002).
13.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion warned expressly that standing served to
exclude beneficiaries of regulation more readily than the subjects of it. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 562 (“Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government
action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”).
14.
See Percival, supra note 12 at 827-28.
15.
397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970),
16.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
399

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2010

conceded in Sierra Club v. Morton17 that aesthetic injuries may be sufficient to
satisfy Article III, the Court has repeatedly raised the bar for establishing
that an aesthetic injury is sufficiently concrete. Thus, in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Foundation, the Court held that recreating in the vicinity of affected
public lands is insufficient to establish a concrete injury where the public
lands at issue are expansive.18 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife highlighted these
difficulties in the context of environmental harms that cross national
borders. There, the injury was not sufficiently concrete because plaintiffs
who worked with endangered species in Egypt that would be wiped out by
flooding had not specified when exactly they next planned on visiting them.19
Holdings like this one prompt the question: What possible interest could be
served by a requirement that environmental groups purchase plane tickets
before bringing suit? The lines that the court draws between aesthetic
injuries that count and aesthetic injuries that do not seem to have little if
anything to do with the ostensible goal of safeguarding the adversarial
process, and a great deal more to do with vestigial notions of what would
have constituted injury at common law.
The second obstacle that Lujan presents to the effective vindication of
environmental claims is the requirement that injury in fact be, not just
concrete, but actual or imminent.20 Limiting standing to actual or imminent
environmental harms is deeply at odds with core rationales of
environmental regulation. Environmental concerns often involve long time
horizons, nonlinear feedback, catastrophic and irreversible harms, and high
degrees of uncertainty.21
When standing excludes claims under
environmental statutes until environmental harms are actual or imminent,
the potential for the judiciary to play an important role in the enforcement
of environmental laws is seriously undermined.22 These concerns apply with
equal or greater force when the environmental problem at issue is one of
international scope. When the environmental harms are not local, but
global, the disconnect between the regulated action and the felt harm tends
to be greater, both temporally and geographically.23 Moreover, global
markets allocate environmental goods and services in such a way that even
localized environmental catastrophes will tend to occur simultaneously,
17.
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
18.
497 U.S. 871, 886-89 (1990).
19. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
20.
Id. at 560.
21.
See generally Robert Nadeau, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENDGAME (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2006).
22.
Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 494 (2008), emphasizes this incongruity in arguing for an approach to standing
that is more consonant with the precautionary principle.
23.
Climate change is an obvious example. See Evan Mills, Insurance in a
Climate of Change, SCIENCE, August 2005, at 1040-44.
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rather than in successive, and thus cautionary, crises.24 The environmental
harms that international environmental agreements are most likely to be
concerned with, therefore, are perhaps the least likely to qualify as actual or
imminent.
The second and third prongs of the test for Article III standing causation and redressability - may also pose problems for plaintiffs seeking
to vindicate environmental claims.
When dealing with complex
environmental phenomena, lines of causation can be extremely difficult to
prove. If plaintiffs were required to establish that particular instances of
non-enforcement of laws, for example, were causally linked to the concrete
harms that they rely on to establish injury in fact, large numbers of citizen
suits would never make it out of the gate. But the treatment of these
requirements in environmental cases is somewhat confused, primarily
because of the relaxation of these requirements for so-called “procedural
injuries.”25 As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, “Congress has
the power to [articulate] chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.”26 But in Lujan, as elsewhere, it was
unclear whether failure to consult under the Endangered Species Act
constituted a “procedural injury” and, if not, why not. A majority of the
Court joined Justice Scalia’s assertion that the plaintiffs were required to
establish causation and redressability, but only a plurality concluded that
they failed in doing so. The imprecisely defined exception for procedural
injuries is further evidence of the atavism of Lujan’s approach to
constitutional standing: the exception is an implicit recognition that private
law notions of injury and causation are fundamentally incompatible with
Congress’s approach to environmental regulation.
There is additional uncertainty surrounding the requirement that an
injury not be generalized or widespread. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., the Court explained, “we have declined to
grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized
grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal
measure.”27 The Court subsequently clarified that, at least where a suit
concerns a procedural injury, “the fact that a political forum may be more
readily available where an injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself,
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”28 Given the
tentative phrasing of the conclusion, however, and the fact that it does

24.
HERMAN DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 164-66 (1996).
25.
Justice Scalia’s enigmatic “footnote 7” concedes that standing
requirements are loosened for procedural injuries, but makes not attempt to define
the term. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 7.
26.
Id. at 580.
27.
438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
28.
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
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appear to be in some tension with the requirement that an injury in fact be
“particularized” and “personal,” some uncertainty persisted as to whether
diffuse harms are enough to satisfy Article III standing. What does seem
clear is that courts are still free to decline to exercise jurisdiction, on
prudential grounds, in such circumstances.29 Given that environmental
harms, especially when they stem from problems of global scope, are often
highly diffuse,30 it is clear that the resolution of this question bears closely
on the enforceability of environmental laws.
This was, broadly speaking, the state of standing doctrine when
Massachusetts v. EPA was decided. In that opinion, the four dissenters hewed
close to Lujan in applying a very strict test for standing. They argued that
petitioners lacked standing for several independently sufficient reasons: the
global scope of climate change defeated the requirement of particularized
injury; the uncertainty surrounding predictions of rising sea levels rendered
the claimed injury “conjecture”; and automobile emissions standards would
not redress the asserted injury, because the contribution of U.S. autos to
global concentrations of greenhouse gases was too small.31
As noted, a majority of five justices disagreed, holding there that the
state of Massachusetts had established standing based on the globalwarming-induced injuries that it alleged.32 So did Massachusetts v. EPA signal
a sea change in the law of standing? Three years later, several key questions
remain unanswered.
Perhaps most fundamentally, Massachusetts v. EPA throws into sharp
relief the mismatch between the types of private law injuries that are
cognizable for standing purposes and the nature of modern environmental
problems. While scientists and politicians alike are focused on the globespanning, macroscopic, and potentially catastrophic harms threatened by
climate change, the Supreme Court of the United States is bound by its own
doctrine of standing to focus on a few inches of Massachusetts coastline.
And the Massachusetts decision made no headway in resolving the apparent
absurdity. Because Justice Stevens’ majority opinion relied on the loss of
this property interest to rising oceans (which process it accepted as having
already begun), it is hard to see Massachusetts v. EPA as a hard case with
respect to concreteness of the injury or imminence of the injury. Future
environmental plaintiffs, therefore, will be bound by the same old rules.
Less clear is whether Massachusetts v. EPA puts to rest concerns that
diffuse or widespread injuries fall short of Article III. Stevens declares that

29.
See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to
None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2005).
30.
See Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress of the
Environment, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 321, 331 (2001).
31.
549 U.S. at 540-46 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
32.
Id. at 535.
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the fact that “climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize
Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation,”33 but then goes on
to explain that the Commonwealth owns “a substantial portion” of the
states’ coastal property. Subsequent cases could presumably distinguish
Massachusetts v. EPA where a private plaintiff, unlike the state of
Massachusetts, possesses no greater aesthetic or property interest than
other members of the public. Nor does Summers v. Earth Island Institute, a
2009 decision on the standing of environmental plaintiffs, resolve the
question.34 There, the Court concluded that no plaintiff had alleged an
injury that was “concrete,” so there was no need to assess whether the injury
was “particularized.”35 In any event, the notion of “concreteness” may yet
prove sufficiently malleable to accommodate some justices’ distaste for
standing rooted in widespread injuries.
Where the Massachusetts v. EPA majority seems to depart most sharply
from the restrictive approach of Lujan is in assessing causation and
redressability. First, they adopt an expansive reading of the “procedural
injury” exception that was alluded to in earlier cases. They accept the
general citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, § 7607(b)(1), which
authorizes suits to compel agency action unlawfully withheld, as a qualifying
statutory articulation of a procedural injury36 - a holding that should have
broad application to several environmental statutes.
Second, they
expansively read the precedents governing the extent to which causation
and redressability requirements are relaxed in such cases, declaring that a
“litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly
harmed the litigant.”37 They go on to make clear that, at least in procedural
injury cases, it is enough for standing that the requested relief would
constitute an incremental step towards redressing the injury complained of.38
All of these moves towards liberalization, however, come with a major
caveat: they may be limited to suits by states parens patriae. In order - it is
widely assumed39 - to secure a fifth vote in the form of Justice Kennedy,
Justice Stevens begins his standing analysis by invoking a case from 1907
concerning a suit by the state of Georgia on behalf of its residents. He
concludes that Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its “quasi-sovereign

33.
Id. at 522.
34.
129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
35.
Id.
36.
549 U.S. at 517-18.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 524.
39.
See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v.
EPA, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2007).
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interests” entitles it to “special solicitude” in questions of standing.40
The million-dollar question, therefore, is whether the Massachusetts
approach to standing extends to private plaintiffs, like environmental
groups,41 and, more specifically, whether Justice Kennedy would support
such an extension of the holding. The most recent case on the Article III
standing of environmental plaintiffs, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, sheds no
light on that question. There, because the Court determined that the
plaintiffs had suffered no concrete injury, it did not reach causation and
redressability.42
Some have questioned the durability of Kennedy’s “defection” to the
liberal wing of the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA,43 especially in light of his
vote two months later in National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, a case where a highly restricted reading of the Endangered Species
Act was adopted by five justices, Kennedy among them.44 And his
concurrence in Lujan is susceptible to widely different interpretations.45
While Justice Kennedy contemplates a greater role for Congress defining
injuries in fact for purposes of Article III standing than does Justice Scalia,
the cases to date give little hint of his view of the scope of that
Congressional power.46 Perhaps the conclusion that can most confidently be
drawn from Massachusetts v. EPA is that “the Justices are even more sharply
split over foundational principles of the regulatory state than they were
before the addition of the Court’s two newest members,”47 with Justice
Kennedy situated somewhere in between the warring camps.
The Supreme Court’s approach to standing, therefore, raises serious
questions about the viability of a bedrock of U.S. environmental law - the
citizen suit. Cass Sunstein concluded in the wake of Lujan that “[i]t is now

40.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
41.
Compare Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73, 115 (“Justice Stevens makes plain that Massachusetts
affects Defenders’ framework directly and suggests that the new analysis should not
be limited to cases involving state petitioners.”) with Stevenson, supra note 32 at 74
(“By conferring special litigation status on the state [Attorneys General], the Court
diminished the litigation role of private activist groups by comparison.”).
42.
129 S.Ct. at 1151.
43.
See Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s
Growing Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 143-44.
44.
551 U.S. 644 (2007).
45.
See Sunstein, supra note 9 at 201 (calling Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence
“somewhat ambiguous”).
46.
See Earth Island, 129 S.Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring), in which Justice
Kennedy suggests obliquely that Congress’s power to “identify” concrete interests
does not extend to converting “procedural” injuries into “concrete” injuries. These
categories, one assumes, would remain for the courts to define.
47.
Percival, supra note 43, at 112.
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apparently the law that Article III forbids Congress from granting standing to
‘citizens’ to bring suit.”48
At the very least, as we have seen, these developments in standing
doctrine will make the burdens on citizens and environmental groups more
onerous. I will argue in Part II that standing doctrine may someday present
insuperable obstacles to citizen suit enforcement with respect to
international environmental problems that are yet to be comprehensively
addressed under U.S. law.
The growing doctrinal obstacles to the enforcement of federal
environmental law via citizen suit are not, of course, strictly confined to
Article III standing. A wide range of justiciability doctrines deter and weaken
environmental citizen suits, including the Administrative Procedure Act’s bar
on “programmatic” challenges to agency action, announced in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation,49 and the arcane distinctions in Norton v. SUWA
between agency “action” and agency “inaction” for purposes of determining
whether the APA permits suit.50
Perhaps the most prominent of these developments is the Court’s 2008
decision in Winter v. NRDC, which raised the bar for even successful
environmental plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief.51 In Winter, the Court
decided that the balance of the equities and the public interest weighed
against granting a preliminary injunction to environmental groups seeking
to force the Navy to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.52
Particularly in the way it characterized the harms to be balanced in that
inquiry - considering the risk of a national security incident but holding the
environmental plaintiffs to a standard of actual, documented, past harm to
wildlife - the Court took an approach to balancing that seemed
systematically to disadvantage environmental plaintiffs.
Interestingly, there were echoes of the Court’s environmental standing
jurisprudence in its balancing-of-the-harms analysis in Winter. Though
NEPA is a procedural statute, the court did not consider or weigh any
procedural harms on the side of the environmental plaintiffs, focusing
instead on the types of harms that environmental plaintiffs traditionally
have had to rely on to establish standing - individualized scientific,
recreational and aesthetic harms.53 At oral argument, Justice Scalia went so
far as to evoke explicitly the requirements of Article III standing in the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Sunstein, supra note 9, at 166.
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
542 U.S. 55 (2004).
129 S.Ct. 365 (2008)
Id. at 378.
Id. at 377.
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discussion of what harms count for purposes of equitable injunctions.54
Thus Winter may yet provide a new opening for reinserting common law
conceptions of injury into these complex regulatory disputes.55
Perhaps most significantly, Winter also announced that a district court
would abuse its discretion in granting an injunction to the environmental
groups even if they ultimately prevailed on the merits.56 Winter thus appears
to represent another significant obstacle in the path of environmental
groups trying to force executive compliance with the law.
Importantly, however, the decisions in National Wildlife Federation, Norton
v. SUWA and Winters are not constitutional. Given sufficient political will,
Congress can smooth those obstacles to environmental citizen suits by
amending the Administrative Procedure Act and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(a), governing preliminary injunctions. Because the core of
Article III standing doctrine is, by contrast, beyond the capacity of Congress
to alter by statute, standing decisions are likely to impose the steepest costs
in enforcement of environmental law in the future.
This cost to effective enforcement should be borne in mind as courts
decide whether to embark down any of the several avenues that exist for
reconciling Article III standing and environmental citizen suits. First, courts
can opt to extend the Massachusetts approach to causation and redressability
to all plaintiffs, rather than confining it to states. They also might
accommodate citizen suits by indulging in some slight of hand concerning
the nature of the injury that is required. Courts have shown themselves
willing, in the past, to sidestep standing difficulties by simply redefining the
injury.57 Thus, in Laidlaw, a “reasonable fear” of illness stemming from toxic
emissions was enough to confer standing.58 A generous application of the
“reasonable fear” approach could go a long way towards getting

54.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24; see generally Christopher Kendall,
Dangerous Waters? The Future of Irreparable Harm Under NEPA after Winter v. NRDC, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109 (2009).
55.
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, by contrast, recognized that NEPA is
concerned with safeguarding an important procedural value - that informed weighing
of environmental consequences precede major government actions. See Winter, 129
S.Ct. at 383. See also the more extensive discussion of importance of considering
procedural harms in equitable balancing in an opinion written by then Judge Breyer
of the 1st Circuit,Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 947 (1st Cir. 1983).
56.
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381.
57.
Cass Sunstein analogizes to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), where an applicant to a medical program could not establish that
affirmative action was the reason for his rejection. The Court ruled that he had
standing by recharacterizing his injury as denial of a chance to compete on an equal
footing with other applicants. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 203-04. To some extent, of
course, this begged the question whether the affirmative action program was
unlawful in the first place.
58.
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv,. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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environmental groups into court. Finally, the most accommodating way
forward, by far, would be to recognize the power of Congress to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation free from the constraints of the
common law.

III. The Problem of Compliance
The ability of citizens to access courts in order to compel executive
compliance with environmental laws may have important repercussions on
the international plane, because domestic enforcement bears on one of the
most fundamental questions in the design of international environmental
agreements - why do states comply with their commitments?
International environmental problems require deep cooperation
among states.
Given the prevalence of physical, economic, and
psychological externalities associated with environmentally harmful
practices, cooperation is necessary to the realization of the mutual benefits
of common solutions.59 Negotiated agreements, of course, only facilitate
cooperation if states comply with them. Furthermore, expectations about
compliance will often constrain the depth of the commitments that states
are willing to make - that is, the extent to which they are willing to depart
from the course that they would have taken in the absence of cooperation.
Just as in private contract situations, states need to be able to rely on
credible commitments by other states, especially when the contemplated
activities are highly reciprocal. A state party may not be willing to embark
on a path of costly pollution control, for example, without highly credible
commitments from peer states that they will make the same sacrifices.
David Victor blames the shallowness of international environmental law
generally on the failure of efforts to develop effective compliance
mechanisms.60
The risk of defection in the environmental context is generally quite
high. Because of scientific and economic uncertainty, the costs and benefits
of cooperation are difficult to predict and assess ex ante. Moreover, this
uncertainty is magnified by the long duration of cooperation that is often
necessary to deal effectively with serious environmental problems.
Similarly, political economy models predict that compliance with
environmental commitments will be inconsistent.61
The costs of

59.
For a basic game theoretic discussion of payoff configurations and
international cooperation, see KENNETH A. OYE, EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY: HYPOTHESES AND STRATEGIES 6-9 (1985).
60.
David Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 148 (1999-2000).
61.
See generally Joseph R. Bial, Daniel Houser & Gary D. Libecap, Public Choice
Issues in Collective Action: Constituent Group Pressures and International Global Warming
Regulation, International Center for Economic Research Working Paper, June 20, 2000.
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environmental regulation are typically highly concentrated, so that regulated
sectors - industry groups in particular - have strong incentives to oppose
compliance over time. The benefits of regulation, by contrast, are typically
diffuse. Beneficiaries face higher transaction costs in organizing in favor of
compliance, and high levels of political mobilization may be unsustainable
over the long term. As Sunstein argues, the fact that environmental
commitments are concluded at all often has to do with the “availability
heuristic.”62
By this reasoning, environmental regulation has more
widespread appeal when environmental harms are more “cognitively
available” - when vivid and salient examples are present in the popular
consciousness. As the cognitive availability of environmental harms fades,
popular support for costly regulatory measures - and thus for compliance
with environmental agreements that compel such measures - tends to fade
as well.
Given these challenges, how can the advocates of international
environmental cooperation ensure compliance with negotiated agreements?
A wide variety of explanations have been advanced to explain observed
compliance. They need not be viewed as mutually exclusive; more likely,
each of these mechanisms contributes in some respect to state compliance.
The leading explanations include the reputational costs of defection,63 the
perceived fairness and legitimacy of negotiated agreements,64 social
learning,65 and administrative capacity-building, both bilateral and
multilateral.66 Transnational legal process theorists, such as Harold Koh and
Anne Marie Slaughter, predict greater compliance stemming from
interactions - direct and indirect - between the legal institutions, broadly
understood, of different countries.67
Other theorists are far less sanguine about the prospects for
compliance with international agreements in the face of changing
conditions. Goldsmith and Posner have famously argued that the discipline

62.
Cass Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Climate Change, John M. Olin Law & Economics Program at the University of Chicago,
Working Paper No. 263, at 5-7 (2005).
63.
See, e.g., George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and
International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. S95 (2002); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
64.
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
65.
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1400-01 (1999).
66.
H. K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance with International
Environmental Accords. 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995).
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of international law mistakes correlation for causation.68 They argue that the
behaviors that international lawyers take to be manifestations of opinio juris
are actually no more than states acting in their own interests. Pursuit of the
national interest, they suggest, happens to produce consistent behaviors, at
most times and in most places, which are mistaken for legal norms.
Relatedly, David Victor and Kal Raustiala have questioned whether
international law - as opposed to international political processes,
culminating in so-called “soft law” - contributes meaningfully to
compliance.69 They point to several instances of highly effective
environmental cooperation among states on the basis of non-legally binding
agreements, and reason that nations may be more likely to agree to robust
monitoring regimes when the commitments at stake are not legally binding.
The accounts of compliance with international law that accord the
most weight to direct enforceability of commitments in domestic legal
systems are liberal theories, which focus on the distinctive domestic
institutions of so-called “liberal states.” Thus, according to David Victor,
there are certain states - liberal democracies - ”in which internal public
pressure [and] robust legal systems make it possible to enforce
international commitments from the inside (ground-up) rather than the
outside (top-down).”70
None of these, however, pays much heed to the potential for domestic
courts to play a role in escaping the compliance dilemma. Even liberal
theories tend to focus instead on interest groups and on the operations of
the political branches.71 Victor identified the existence of independent
judiciaries as one of three factors explaining heightened compliance with
international obligations by liberal states, but left the idea unexplored. He
emphasized that “[m]ore work is needed to unravel [the] conditions under
which they are most effective.”72
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Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 63, 69-70 (1999).
69.
David G. Victor, The Use and Effectiveness of Nonbinding Instruments in the
Management of Complex International Environmental Problems, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
241, 246 (1997); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659
(David G. Victor et al. eds.) (1998).
70.
Victor, supra note 60 at 148.
71.
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Commitments: Japan and the United States, in THEORY AND STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 399 (Charles Lipson & Benjamin J Cohen, eds.) (1999), is an effort
to explain U.S. commitment with international obligations in terms of domestic
institutions, but no mention is made of the role of the judiciary. Kal Raustiala,
Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation Comparative Responses to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, WORLD POLITICS 482 (1997), similarly excludes courts
from its institutional analysis.
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Oona Hathaway offers empirical support for the hypothesis that
domestic legal enforcement contributes meaningfully to compliance with
international obligations.73 After reviewing a range of studies, both
qualitative and quantitative, that assess compliance with human rights law,
she reaches two conclusions that are relevant here. First, states that boast
independent judiciaries, media, and political parties are more likely to join
treaties when their human rights practices are good, and are more likely to
improve their practices upon joining.74 In other words, they take their
international legal obligations seriously.
Second, just as domestic
enforcement contributes to international compliance, the existence of
“robust domestic rule-of-law institutions” tends to strengthen domestic
enforcement.75 Hathaway concludes, therefore, that work to strengthen local
rule of law serves the ultimate goal of compliance with international human
rights agreements.76
In the environmental context, the compliance-reinforcing potential of
domestic enforcement mechanisms is particularly pronounced. In the
United States, citizen suits have been tremendously effective at forcing
executive compliance, at both the federal and state levels, with the major
federal environmental statutes. James May offers this assessment:
Citizen suits work; they have transformed the environmental
movement, and with it, society. Citizen suits have secured
compliance by myriad agencies and thousands of polluting
facilities, diminished pounds of pollution produced by the
billions, and protected hundreds of rare species and thousands
of acres of ecologically important land. The foregone monetary
value of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable agency
resources and saved taxpayers billions.77
Citizen suits are a staple of federal environmental law: nearly every
major environmental statute imparts a private right of action to citizens.78
And nearly 75 percent of all actions to enforce domestic environmental laws
take the form of citizen suits.79 Steps to make the environmental treaty
obligations of the executive branch enforceable by citizen suit, therefore,
may be expected to improve compliance.
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Sunstein, supra note 9, at 165-66, n. 11.
79.
May, supra note 77, at 6-7.
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Two overarching approaches to enforcement of international
commitments by citizen suit are possible. First, environmental agreements
could be made to include more specific, self-executing obligations, from the
outset.80 Alternatively, international agreements could continue to adhere
to the model common to the Montreal and Kyoto protocols, whereby states
commit to broad quantitative reductions, only now with an additional treaty
obligation to provide for private enforcement of subsequent implementing
legislation in the domestic legal system. Although this latter option would
leave some margin for noncompliance, that margin would be highly
circumscribed. Most noncompliance with environmental obligations is not
through overt repudiation at the level of the executive or national
legislature, but through non-enforcement.81 Thus, whether international
environmental agreements themselves create privately enforceable rights or
those provisions are instead inserted later at the time of passage of
implementing legislation by the legislature, the availability of citizen suits
will greatly diminish the opportunity for states subsequently to renege
through inaction on their commitments.82 The key is to harness the
enforcement potential of citizen suits in service of international compliance.
This strategy is further recommended by the fact that domestic courts
may be particularly well-suited, in institutional terms, to the task of longterm enforcement in the environmental context. Independent judiciaries
are, in part by definition, more insulated from politics than the executive
and the legislature, which means that they are also insulated from some of
the most dangerous biases of political actors: short-termism, tendency to
undervalue low-risk events, and unwillingness to face up to catastrophic
risk.83 Yet, generally speaking, domestic courts are not so insulated from the
political tenor of a country so as to fail to perceive the costs of compliance.84
Hence, they offer a solution to the vexing trade-off between credibility and
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For more on the problem of self-execution of treaty obligations, see Lucy
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flexibility faced by the framers of international agreements in which
environmental commitments - with their uncertain long-term costs - are at
issue. What a country wants is to be bound when the question is close - so
as to be able to make a credible commitment - but not when, from their
perspective, circumstances have changed so much as to excuse
noncompliance.85 States are understandably wary of trusting foreign or
international authorities to recognize and accommodate such instances of
changed circumstances. A domestic institution is more likely to do so, even
in cases of true judicial independence, simply by virtue of shared
background assumptions that inhere in national identity and culture.
Maximizing the extent to which international environmental commitments
can make use of domestic legal institutions, therefore, may allow for optimal
pre-commitment strategies.
In addition to being highly effective, domestic enforcement of
international environmental commitments is likely to be more politically
palatable, at the stage of institutional design and ratification, than the
alternatives.86 Existing international agreements in this area are notable for
their lack of monitoring, sanctions, and other international oversight
mechanisms.87 In the United States, at least, concerns about loss of
national sovereignty to international institutions are highly politically
salient, and often carried to irrational, even paranoid, extremes.88 Thus,
political resistance to foreign and international monitoring and sanctions
regimes often goes far beyond what one would expect given the simple risk
that those institutions will be insufficiently attentive to national interests in
hard cases. This resistance means that any achievements in international
oversight often come at the expense of the depth of the commitments
made.89 In the environmental context, therefore, provision for domestic
judicial enforcement of international commitments may be a Goldilocks
solution: just enough precommitment, without the steep political price
upfront.
Such a strategy, however, is closely bound up with the difficult
questions about standing doctrine that were discussed in Part I. A

85.
The concept is analogous to the doctrine of impossibility in the common
law of contract.
86.
Roger Fisher recognized that “[a] government would rather be told what
to do by its own courts than by a foreign or international court.” IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (Robert Kogod Goldman, ed.) (1981).
87.
Victor, supra note 60, at 163.
88.
For a taste of these concerns about sovereignty, see Andrew T. Guzman &
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1693, 1694-95
(2008).
89.
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L.
581, 609 (2005) (exploring the complex trade-offs between oversight mechanisms,
legality, and depth).
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hospitable doctrine of standing is among the conditions necessary for
making domestic courts an effective tool in ensuring compliance with
international environmental agreements. If, instead, standing doctrine
continues to constrict the environmental citizen suits that make it into
court, these compliance benefits will be commensurately foregone.
Ironically, standing doctrine will sweep most broadly in excluding citizen
enforcement in a substantive area such as environmental law where the
achievement of international cooperation was already highly challenging. In
a further irony, the imminence and causation requirements of restrictive
standing doctrine will make domestic enforcement most difficult to attain
precisely when international institutions are most in need of support from
domestic sources of compliance pressure: at the early stages of cooperation
to address an incipient environmental problem.
Climate change is the prime example of these risks, but the mismatch
between standing doctrine and the substance of international
environmental cooperation is institutional; it has the potential to extend far
beyond the particular problem of climate change. Other environmental
regimes promise even less concrete, more diffuse, and longer-term benefits
from regulation. For example, failure of states to heed commitments
directed towards preserving biodiversity will often fail to implicate any
plaintiffs in particular.90
What American has an “injury-in-fact,” as
interpreted by Justice Scalia, when an agency fails to take action to preserve
the genetic diversity of obscure insects, plant species, or microorganisms,
the use value of which to humans is almost nonexistent in the short or
medium term?91 Another highly problematic example is explored by Paul
Hawken, Amory Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins in Natural Capitalism.92 Several
European countries have made great strides in reducing demand for natural
resources and supply of solid waste by imposing responsibility for disposal
and other “full life-cycle costs” on the manufacturers of consumer durables
and industrial products. But when the environmental goods and services
conserved by European states are freely traded, other economies can freeride off of their efforts. If the United States agreed by treaty to impose
similar requirements on manufacturers, what citizens would have standing
to challenge executive noncompliance with resulting legislation?
The doctrine of Article III standing has profound and far-reaching
consequences for United States participation in international regimes to
address the pressing environmental problems of today and tomorrow. If
standing doctrine remains restrictive, unpredictable, and immune to
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alteration by Congress, the international environment will pay part of the
price.

IV. Credibility as Negotiating Advantage
The course of United States standing doctrine, of course, will not
directly influence the enforceability of internationally agreed-upon
environmental rules within other countries.
Therefore, one might
legitimately question the extent to which a change in the domestic law of
one state - even that of a hegemonic power - will meaningfully affect the
prospects for effective international coordination.93
One response to such criticism is that removing one obstacle to
greater reliance on domestic enforceability in international environmental
regimes is a step in the right direction. As Justice Stevens reasoned in
Massachusetts v. EPA, that a step is incremental does not defeat its utility.94
But there also is a separate, stronger response: More robust domestic
enforcement will strengthen the hand of the United States in international
negotiations, whether or not other countries move in the same direction.
The academic literature surrounding negotiation has a tendency to
analyze the concept of credibility in the context of threats. That is, in
bargaining over the spoils within a zone of possible agreement, the party
that is able to tie its own hands or burn its bridges (or create the credible
impression of having done so), alters (or obscures) its true bottom line. By
threatening to walk away from the table, that party captures a greater share
of the mutual benefits from agreement.95 But as I explain, the capacity to
make credible promises is also an asset in negotiation.
The weakening of domestic enforcement of environmental law renders
less valuable the promises made by U.S. negotiators,96 by the following
chain of causation: More restrictive environmental standing hinders
domestic judicial enforcement, which in turn makes defection by the
executive more likely, which drives negotiating partners to discount the
value of promised actions by the (increased) likelihood of defection, thereby
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rendering U.S. promises less valuable. As a result, the U.S. is able to get
less in exchange for its promises in international environmental
negotiations.
Many scholars, however, emphasize the value of flexibility in
international agreements, particularly in situations of uncertainty.97 An
advocate of restrictive standing might, in reliance on these analyses, argue
that the gain in flexibility to the United States is worth the cost in terms of
lost credibility. But the hypothesized Lujan apologist would be wrong.
Weakened enforcement by the domestic courts serves only to narrow the
range of options available to the political branches in the international
arena. Whereas a state that is able to make credible promises can calibrate
the value of a promise by varying its substantive content as it wishes, a state
lacking credibility is limited in what it can (effectively, credibly) promise. In
other words, a state in possession of credibility can still enjoy the benefits of
flexibility, but the reverse is not true.
Strategies of pre-commitment like domestic enforceability may be
particularly useful to hegemonic powers like the United States. Hegemons
of course, have a strong interest in preservation of the status quo. While
ascendant political forces in the United States have, up to the present,
identified the interests of the status quo as in conflict with concerted global
action to deal with environmental problems, that position may no longer be
tenable. Climate change and other looming ecological crises - not the
efforts to deal with them - in fact pose the greater existential threat to the
current global order, and American political elites are beginning to
understand the need to address them. Thus, the nominees of both major
American political parties expressed strong rhetorical support for efforts to
deal with climate change in 2008, and a comprehensive cap-and-trade bill
passed the House, but not the Senate, in 2009.98 For a hegemonic power to
convince other states to cooperate on its terms, however, it must be able to
make credible commitments. Otherwise, the world will remain all too aware
of the power of the hegemon to renege after the fact.99
The U.S.’s need for credibility on the world stage derives not only from
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structural factors. Though America’s image in the world has rebounded
substantially since the election of President Obama,100 it was held in much
lower esteem just one year ago.101 And its perceived flouting of international
norms was an important contributor to that decline.102
The Bush
administration’s salient decisions to opt out of multilateral efforts, including
“unsigning” the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and non-participation in
the Kyoto process are unlikely to be completely overlooked by global leaders
considering long-term reciprocal cooperation with the United States,
Obama’s recent charm offensives notwithstanding.
The international community is painfully aware of the periodic
willingness of the political branches - particularly the executive - in the
United States to spurn international obligations when interests so dictate.
Many point out, however, that these manifestations of United States
“exceptionalism” consisted not in noncompliance - violation of a binding
legal norm - but rather in perfectly legal decisions to opt out of international
processes.103 The point is true for what it is worth, but prominent instances
of U.S. noncompliance with binding legal norms are, nonetheless, fairly easy
to identify.
One of these instances of noncompliance is the requirement of
consular notification in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.104 In
Medellin v. Texas,105 the Supreme Court held that the state of Texas was not
bound to refrain from executing Ernesto Medellin, even though the United
States was indisputably in breach of its obligations under that treaty.106
Domestic considerations of federalism and procedural default, therefore,
trumped international compliance, much to the dismay of Mexico and many
others in the international community.107 Domestic procedural law also,
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arguably, trumped international obligations for some time in the case of the
prisoners of the war on terror held at Guantanamo. With respect to those
individuals, the protections of the Geneva Conventions were undone - or at
least very significantly delayed - by the jurisdictional requirements of U.S.
law.108 Comprehensive treatment of these controversies is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the basic point is clear: the U.S.’s prospective negotiating
partners are likely to be attentive to the risk that procedural hurdles - like
strict standing - will undermine U.S. compliance in the environmental arena
as well.

V. Conclusion
Several unresolved questions about Article III standing have important
implications for the viability and effectiveness of citizen suits in
environmental cases. If courts continue the recent trend of allowing
procedural doctrines to restrict these suits, the shift may have important
international repercussions which have not yet been fully reckoned with.
Most important among these is that the unavailability of domestic
enforcement of environmental laws through citizen suits will tend to
undermine compliance with international environmental obligations. Both
the negotiating position of the United States and the prospects for effective
cooperation on the most pressing environmental issues facing humanity will
suffer accordingly.
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